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Abstract 
 
Topic of this thesis is Dennett's criticism of the philosophical notion of qualia. First, 
the notion of qualia and the meaning it acquires within philosophy are introduced. Then, four 
thought experiments are presented to serve as an argument in favor of existence of qualia 
along with Dennett's reaction to these thought experiments. After that, Dennett's criticism of 
qualia as immediately apprehensible, ineffable, intrinsic and private properties of conscious 
mental states is introduced while one of the most common objections to this criticism is 
emphasized – Dennett's conception of qualia is too narrow and we can preserve it in a 
moderate way. Subsequently, the thesis outlines such a modest concept – the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness. This thesis attempts to show that there is no place for phenomenal 
consciousness in Dennett's heterophenomenology and Multiple Drafts model and that Dennett 
is as skeptical about this term as he is about the notion of qualia. In the end, the thesis asks the 
question whether it is really necessary to give up the concept of phenomenal consciousness if 
we want to study consciousness scientifically – from the third-person point of view.  
 
